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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this dissertation is to delve a bit deeper than 
has been done before into various aspects of the theory of the multi-
product firm. In particular, the work is of the nature of an exploration 
Into a quite complex^  area and as such no claim is made with respect to 
having presented a complete, overall, theory of the multiproduct firm. 
The presentation itself is divided into three chapters and an 
Appendix. Chapter II, then, deals with the short run cost minimiza­
tion problem of a multiproduct firm operating in a productive atmosphere 
characterized by independent production. That is to say the level of 
output of any one final good is not affected directly by the output 
level of any other final good the firm produces. Mathematically such a 
situation amounts to the positing of r independent production functions, 
each one pertaining to one of the r goods the firm produces. 
In particular the formulation of the problem is such that an initial 
allocation of fixed factors is made over the various r production proc­
esses of interest. This initial allocation is made directly previous to 
the particular short run of Interest and it is assumed that no real­
location of those fixed factors is possible for the duration of the 
period. 
In this problem, as well as those treated in the following chapters, 
the fixed factors themselves are given a somewhat more explicit role 
P^erhaps one should add "relatively neglected." 
2 
than Is usually the case In contemporary neo-classical production theory. 
In particular, the fixed factors appear in production functions at usage 
rather than capacity levels, a consideration which allows one to take 
explicit account of excess capacity in a multiproduct (or single product) 
firm that uses both fixed and variable factors of production. 
The third chapter again deals with cost minimization but the treat­
ment is somewhat briefer than the previous problem in that it does not 
deal with the vagaries of excess capacity to the extent that Chapter II 
does. The production function used to characterize the productive 
atmosphere in which the firm under consideration finds itself is almost 
identical to that denoted by Dano [8] as representative of what he calls 
"classical joint production" and which in turn is characterized by his 
mentor, the Nobel Laureate, Frisch [11], as possessing a degree of 
assortment one less than the number of goods being produced by the firm. 
Again, as in the previous problem, the explicit usage levels of 
fixed as well as variable input levels are included in the production 
function. However, in contrast to that previous problem, here fixed 
factors may be thought of as amenable to being, costlessly, switched from 
production of one good to that of another good. This last consideration 
leads to the positing of an opportunity cost associated with the assign­
ment of scarce factors. The existence of such a cost is of particular 
interest in Chapter IV where the firm is assumed to produce under these 
conditions given in Chapter III. 
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Profit maximization is the concern of the fourth and final chapter. 
Here the concepts of nonprice offer variation^  and the sales function of 
the firm are introduced, discussed, and incorporated into the analysis. 
In particular, prices and N.P.O.V.'s become, as opposed to quantities, 
the relevant decision or control variables of the firm in its attempt to 
maximize net revenue. 
The results of this last chapter highlight, rather clearly, the 
supposition that the multiproduct firm is concerned with the effects 
that changes in decision variables induce in sales and production through­
out its posited product line. This consideration is greatly stressed, 
not only through the very nature of the mathematical terms comprising 
the necessary conditions to be inspected but also through the economic 
interpretation of such conditions. 
The first order necessary conditions are somewhat different than 
those which usually appear in contemporary textbook treatment of the 
firm in that opportunity costs associated with the allocation of scarce 
factors at the margin are treated on an equal footing with marginal 
variable costs. The rationale for such a treatment is revealed through 
a demonstration involving the second order necessary conditions for a 
local maximum in an appropriately defined problem. 
2 
Throughout, interest is focused almost exclusively upon production 
devoted to current sales, that is, production of saleable products and 
H^enceforth to be referred to as N.P.O.V. 
2 The almost refers to a brief excursion in Chapter II. 
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N.P.O.V.'s destined to be sold and offered during the short run of in­
terest. Therefore it is assumed that the firm of interest is operating 
with zero inventory accumulation, that is, as Holdren [15, p. 580] puts 
it, "We assume unless otherwise stated, that the firm is not undertaking 
intentional inventory accumulation or decumulation." This last assump­
tion, often implicity made but rarely explicitly stated, allows one to 
set production equal to sales. 
The mathematical technique employed throughout is that of nonlinear 
programming. This technique was chosen because it gives one the ability 
to consider both equality and inequality constraints in the same problem 
in a somewhat natural fashion; natural pertaining to the supposition 
:hat this technique seems to be a tailor-made language for the economist.^  
The technique is used to postulate necessary conditions for a 
maviTninn (minimum) of a real valued twice differentiable function defined 
on some open subset of . The necessary conditions postulated are of 
both the first and second order, the latter conditions pertaining to a 
local maximum (minimum) and the former pertaining to any maximum (min­
imum). The normality condition assumed, that is, the condition the 
fulfillment of which allows one to postulate that the aforementioned 
necessary conditions are indeed necessary, is the rank condition of the 
Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa [2] constraint qualification theorem. A general 
nonlinear programming problem incorporating mixed constraints is presented 
T^hat nonlinear programming is such a language has been impressed 
upon me (quite often) by my major professor Bob Holdren. 
5 
as an appendix and should be of 
directed towards presenting all 
velc-ment of the three chapters 
interest in that it is specifically 
the conditions incorporated in the de-
to follow. 
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CHAPTER II. COST MINIMIZATION UNDER CONDITIONS 
OF INDEPENDENT PRODUCTION 
The work in this chapter is concerned with the cost minimization 
problem of a multiproduct firm producing r goods under conditions of 
independent production. Mathematically such a situation amounts to the 
positing of r independent production functions. 
The problem is cast in terms of a short run situation, and in 
particular, of the many short runs one might consider, this one involves 
a production period such that at the outset of the period the fixed 
factors of production are allocated for use among the various production 
processes. Furthermore, once this initial allocation has been made 
there is no possibility of reallocation of those fixed factors; a con­
sideration which holds for the duration of the period under considera­
tion. 
Previously, a similar problem was treated by Ralph Pfouts [20], 
however he allowed switching (reallocation) of fixed factors at any time 
during the production period if warranted by a compensation greater than 
the costs of the reallocation itself. Pfouts' treatment is repeated in 
Benavie [5] and Ferguson [9] and is adopted by Naylor [19] in the con­
text of a profit maximization problem and again, but to a lesser degree, 
by Swenson [25]. 
Some of the notation to be used in this, as well as the following 
chapters, and explanation thereof, is presented directly below: 
7 
V  =  ( v ^ ,  . V j ,  V g ) ,  V j  >  0 ,  j  =  ( 1 ,  s )  ,  
where is the level of usage of the variable factor of production . 
 ^~~ (y^ ) • • • » • • • » y^ ) > y^  ^  o» k — (i, » « * t) , 
where is the maximum amount available of the fixed factor of produc­
tion Yj^ . 
 ^~~ (y^ » •••» y^ » •••» y^ )» y^  ^   ^~~ (1» •••» t) , 
where is the level of usage of Y^ . 
Q — •••> •••» 9^ )* 9  ^0, i — (Ij « « * r) , 
where is the level of output of good 
The production functions are given by 
9~ '^ i^ i^l' ***» i^j' •••' ^ is' ^ il' i^k* '**> i^t^ ' 
i = (1, r) (2.1) 
Some of the goods being produced are saleable output while others 
are N.P.O.V.'s. However, there is not need to differentiate between 
them until Chapter IV. 
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> 0; denotes the usage level of the variable input used in 
the production of the i^  ^good, > 0; denotes the usage level of 
the fixed input used in the production of the i^  ^good. 
The cost function is given by 
T.C. = C(vL, ..., v., ...» V ) + F (2.2) 
-L 3 s 
where 
r 
C = I C (v V , ..., V. ) , 
i_l 1 IJ IS 
and F represents fixed costs. 
Finally, the initial allocation of fixed factors is represented 
by 
_ r _ 
y,, = I y.k, k = (1, ..., t) (2.3) 
i=l 
Mathematically, the cost minimization problem is as follows: 
Minimize 
r 
C = I •••» Vij' ' vjg) + F (2.4) 
9 
subject to 
9]^  ~ *•*' ' **** ^ Is' ^ 11 I^k' *'*' ^ It^  ~~ ® 
9~ *••' j' * i^s* ^ il* * i^k' ***» ~ 0 
<lr - Sr^ r^l' *••' ^ rj' ' ' ^rs' ^ rl' ' ^rk' ' ^rt^  " ° 
>0, i = (1, ...» r), k  = (1, ..., t) 
v_ > 0, j = (1, ..., s) 
i^k : " •' 
* * 
Assume now that (V , Y ) is a feasible point of the constraint set and 
that at (V , Y ) the first 2<s4-t-rof the inequality constraints 
are binding. Consider now the jacobian matrix [J] (below) evaluated at 
(V*, Y*), 
All functions and constraints are assumed to be real valued and 












3v. *•* 9y^  9y^  
9q^  9qi 
9q^  9q^  
9yt 
'^ s *?! 
9y. 
9q^  9q^  
sGk '"' 
(2.5) 
(£+r) X (s+t) 
* * 
If the rank of (J) is &+r, where &+r < s+t then one can say that (V , Y ) 
is a regular point in the sense that it satisfies a constraint qualifica­
tion or normality condition. The above criterion for normality is 
developed by Arrow, Hurwicz and Uzawa [2] and is particularly useful in 
the case in which both inequality and equality constraints must be con­
sidered and one does not wish to start out by positing restrictive 
A^ is a portion of the jacobian of an arbitrary set of i inequality 
constraints. 
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assumptions on the curvature of the constraints. Economically one 
might say that the assumption of normality rules out degenerate cases; 
cases in which there is no choice to be made between alternate produc-
2 
tion points and therefore no minimization problem to be considered. In 
particular the satisfaction of such a condition is sufficient to proceed 
to the inspection of first order conditions emanating from the lagrangean 
in the sense that such conditions are indeed necessary for a minimum at 
(V*, Y*). 
The lagrangean expression is written as follows 
r 
L(V,y,A,U) = I v^ j, ..., v^ g) +F 
r _ 
I i^^ '^ i~^ i^ i^l' i^i ' *'*' ^ is* ^ il' * i^k* ' ^it^  ^i=l 
+ j, J, (2-*) 
1=1 k=l 
where 
Especially true in this case since production functions comprise 
the r equality constraints. Also note that the positing of the subset 
of inequality constraints which are binding at (V*, Y ) is any arbitrary 
choice. 
2 This is of course an oversimplified explanation in a mathematical 
sense but is nonetheless the economically relevant one. 
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* * 
In order for the point (V , Y ) to minimize C subject to the posited 
constraints the following conditions must be satisfied when evaluated at 
* * * * 
(V , Y , X , U ), 
3C. 3q. 
3v • ° 
il ij 
SC. 3q. 
3V.. " ^ (^3V..) - ° 
ij 
3C. 3q. 
3V^  \^ 3V. - ° 
IS is 
where 
i = (1, r), j = (1, ..., s) 
-^ i(^ ) - "il 2 0 
3qi 
where 
i = (1, r) 
13 
and 
"ik - i^j - i^k - °  ^K 
where K is the feasible set. 
The conditions denoted by (2.7) are comprised of r sets of ine­
qualities where each set itself is comprised of s inequalities. As­
suming that all variable inputs are used at positive levels,^  and 
dividing the by the k^  ^equation of the i^  ^set of equations denoted 
by (2.7), where k, je(l, ..., s), ie(l, ..., r), yields the following 
conditions 
3C./3v.. 3q./3v.. 
3C773  ^"  ^ * (2 *^) 
Assuming that the firm buys its variable factors of production in per­
fectly competitive markets (2.9) may be written as 
w. 3q./3v 
-J- = ^  . (2.10) 
The interpretation of (2.10) is that the price ratio of any two variable 
inputs used in the production of good i must be equal to the correspond­
ing ratio of their marginal physical products in the production of good 
T^he inequalities now become equations. 
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i.^  Alternatively, the productive yield of the last dollar spent on 
variable input j for production of good i must be equal to that of the 
last dollar spent on variable input k used in production of good i. 
If on the other hand the assumption that v^  ^>0, j = (1, ..., s), 
is dropped and it is assumed that v^  ^> 0 while v^ j, = 0, j, ke(l, 
s),^  and furthermore that the strict inequality holds in the k^  ^in­
equality of (2.7), then (2.10) should appear in the altered form 
3q /3v w 
aqi/avik " Wk 
or 
9qi/9v • 3q /3v 
— > —i . (2.12) 
"j "'k 
The interpretation of (2.12) is that the marginal productive yield of a 
dollar spent on input j in the production of good i is greater than that 
3 
of a dollar spent on input k in the production of good i. 
W^here w. is the competitive price of v. and is the competitive 
price of v^ . ^   ^
# k. 
3 Which is of course the reason why v^  ^= 0. Further results with 
respect to variable input usage could be imagined, however interpreta­
tions depend on values in terms of net revenues, a factor which could 
be quite misleading at this stage, given the nature of the decision 
variables of the multiproduct firm. This observation should be borne 
out by a glance at Chapter IV. 
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Before proceeding any further in this inspection of necessary 
conditions, perhaps it should be pointed out, especially in light of the 
familiarity of those conditions already considered, that the multi-
product firm, even at this early stage of the game, is more than a mere 
collection of individual firms in that: 
(a) there was an initial decision made with respect to the alloca­
tion of fixed factors among the various production processes 
the firm engages in; 
(b) the point of production actually chosen, that is the ultimate 
output mix, depends on factors other than those determining 
output level for the single product firm regardless of the 
degree of competition it faces 
(c) there is, under altered conditions, the possibility of switch-
2 ing fixed factors among alternative production processes. 
Returning now to the task interrupted, consider the set of condi-
* * 
tions denoted by (2.7) and (2.8). If (V , Y ) does indeed yield a cost 
minimum then > 0 in the sense that increases in output levels require 
additional variable and/or fixed factors. In particular efficient 
operation implies that 
3C 9q. q. 
T^his consideration, (b), will receive much attention in Chapter IV. 
2 See Chapter III and the Appendix. 
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Obviously, unless forced to, a firm will not employ a variable factor 
whose marginal physical product is > 0. Note also that efficiency 
considerations lead the firm to increase fixed factor usage as long 
as such increases yield marginal products which are 'positive.^  The 
reason for this being that fixed factors represent a sunken cost and 
therefore their productive possibilities will be exhausted before 
fresh funds are allocated for the purchase of variable factors. 
Consider now a movement along the isosurface in the neighbor-
* * 
hood of (V , Y ), where 
Equation (2.14) indicates that the increased usage of a fixed factor, 
where efficient, allows the firm to reduce usage of variable factors 
2 
thereby reducing the variable costs of producing the given output. 
Therefore fixed factor usage will be intensified as long as such is 
feasible and efficient. 
MP = 0 = > indifference, however, it shall be assumed that the 
firm stops employing additional units of a fixed factor at the initial 
level of usage at which its marginal product disappears. 
2 All this merely says, in more familiar form, that an increase in 
fixed factors, wehre efficient, denotes a parametric shift in the pro­
duction function yielding the same output level at lower usage of 
variable factors and therefore lower cost. However the above develop­
ment is more in line with the direction to be taken in this chapter and 
the following ones. 
17 
Look now at the set of the r sets of equations denoted by 
(2.8) and consider in particular the case where all around excess 
capacity exists, that is the instance in which y^ j^  < y^ ,^ k = (1, 
t). If in addition y^  ^> 0 then 
3q 3c. 3q 
X — = 0 = »— T i = (1, r), k = (1, t) (2.15) 
where > 0 implies that 3q^ /9y^  ^= 0, which is the conclusion men­
tioned above (e.g., intensity usage of y^  ^until its marginal physical 
product disappears). An intuitive approach to this conclusion is 
offered below in Figure 1 where the good being considered is Q^ , the 
production function is q^  = q^ (v^ 2, y^ )^ and the graphics are adopted 
from Krauthamer (17). 
In Figure 1, OB represents the ridge line along which the marginal 
* * 
physical product of y^  ^vanishes; (y^ ,^ v^ )^ minimizes the cost of 
— — * 
producing at the specified level q^  and y^  ^- y^  ^denotes excess 
capacity. It can be seen from Figure 1 that the firm will expand along 
OB until full capacity (y^ )^ is reached. This is essentially the mean­
ing of (2.15) except for the fact that y^  ^= y^  ^was excluded from 
consideration in that case. 
Figure 1, in a sense, offers the implicit warning that at the out-
— * 
put level q^  it is y^  ^that should appear in the production function 
rather than y^ *^ Dano [8] is quite adamant on this very point. 
18 
•J 
Figure 1. Ridge line 
Finally, a graphical interpretation of (2.14) is given through the 
consideration of a movement along the isoquant, the movement emanating 
* * 
from v^ )^ and terminating at (y^ ,^ v^ )^ where the reduction in 
costs is given by w^ (v^  ^- v^ )^ and (2.14) appears as the approxima­
tion 
This procedure of demonstrating the effects of increasing fixed 
factors on variable costs will be given a slightly more rigorous treat­
ment in the later part of this chapter. 
19 
<'u - \1> - 3^ <4 - ° ° • 
* — 
The next case to be considered is that in which and = 
0. In this instance the constraint on fixed factor k in production of 
good i is barely binding, that is, a reduction in usage of that fixed 
factor would be detrimental in the sense that the output level 
would not be achieved under cost minimizing conditions, while an in­
creased usage level of fixed factor k, were such feasible, could not 
reduce the costs of producing the good at the specified level. The 
condition for such a situation is given by picking the appropriately 
* — 
subscripted equation from (2.15) and appending it with = y^ .^ For 
all around barely binding constraints the condition is (2.15) with the 
additional stipulation that y*^  ' i = (i r). k = (1. .... t). 
Graphically, looking again at the production of in the two input case 
the portrayal is as given in Figure 2 (below) where the interpretation 
warrants no further discussion. 
* — — 
If y^ j^  = y^ ,^ u^ j^  = 0, k = (1, ..., t), and q^  is the profit maxi­
mizing level of output of then this firm might be called a perfect 
capacity planner with respect to production of [given that (2.7) is 
fulfilled). If y^ j^  = y^ ^^  u^ j^  =0, i = (1, ..., r), k = (1, ..., r) and 
Q is the profit maximizing output then the firm in question might be 
termed a perfect capacity planner in the sense that even if switching 
were feasible at a zero cost the firm would abstain from any change in 
20 




Figure 2. Barely binding constraint 
its original allocation of fixed factors among the various production 
processes. One might then proceed a bit further along the above track 
and go on to define efficiency in production as the satisfaction of 
(2.7) and (2.8) plus the requirement that at the actual production 
levels chosen all the constraints on fixed factors must be barely 
binding.^  
There are however many reasons why such an extension might be of 
somewhat limited usefulness, the first and most obvious reason being 
that it might seem somewhat silly to attempt to posit planning criteria 
in the context of a problem that excludes explicit consideration of 
The barely binding criterion may, perhaps, appear to be on different 
footing than (2.7) and (2.8) and for that matter different than efficiency 
criteria as normally seen for the single product firm [(2.7); i = 1, y = y 
treated as parameter in production function]. In particular the reason 
for the difference is that the barely binding criterion deals with one 
point rather than all points on a particular expansion path, however it 
would seem somewhat unreasonable to talk about capacity planning at other 
than the production point chosen. 
21 
investment activities at the outset of the analysis. However the prob­
lem the firm faces, that is in particular the capacity it has available 
is of course the outcome of previous decisions and therefore the presence 
of excess or insufficient capacity devoted solely to production of 
current saleable goods and N.P.O.V.'s should indeed offer some clue as 
to the firm's degree of efficiency with respect to capacity planning.^  
Another objection might be that the trouble with such an extension 
of efficiency criteria for the firm is that although a bit more general 
than previous criteria they are still partial in the same sense that 
2 
Samuelson [23] notes the partiality of general equilibrium analysis. 
Again this would be a cogent point and gratefully acknowledged. There­
fore, in light of tenuousness of position the perfect capacity planning 
case is not posited as any sort of criterion but merely as an observa­
tion. 
Continuing on again with the inspection of necessary conditions one 
might say that it is not at all clear that u^  ^> 0 has any positive 
implications for planning other than as a possible signal that the firm 
might wish to investigate the possibility of expanding capacity in the 
future, however such decisions involve a myriad of considerations out­
side the scope of this study. In the problems to follow (Chapter III 
O^bviously the last statement is not in nature of a rebuttal since 
any real consideration of investment requires a somewhat different frame 
of reference than the one chosen for this analysis. 
2 
In particular externalities in production have not been, nor shall 
they be, mentioned. 
22 
and IV) will be interpreted in terms of opportunity cost and net 
revenue, however in the present problem there is no switching which in a 
sense emasculates the notion of opportunity costs (that is, in the sense 
of how that concept will be used later on) and as noted previously, 
bringing marginal revenue terms into the analysis at this point would be 
quite misleading. One can say, however that u^ j^  < 0 and u^  ^> 0, where 
i, je(l, ..., r) and again the actual level of production is the point 
of interest, indicates an initial misallocation of fixed factor k, too 
much of it having been allocated to production of and not enough for 
The following is a summary of possibilities already (explicitly or 
implicitly) examined with respect to fixed factor usage: 
(a) = 0 and 0 < y*^  < y^ ,^ ie(l, ..., r), ke(l r), 
implies excess of fixed factor k in production of Q^ ; 
(b) U*^  = 0 and 0 < y*^  < y^ ,^ ie(l, , r), k = 1, (1, t). 
implies all around excess capacity in the production of 
(c) = 0 and 0 < y^ j^  < y^ ,^ i = (1, r), k = (1, t), 
Of course, the set of all possible cases is not exhausted in the 
listing given. Other cases may be easily imagined but are not treated on 
the grounds that there is something to be said for the avoidance of tedium. 
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implies all around excess capacity. 
* * — (d) = 0 and = y^ ,^ ie(l, ..., r), k = (1, t). 
implies perfect capacity planning production of 
(d) = 0 and y^ j^  = y^ ,^ i = (1, r), k = (1, t), 
implies perfect capacity planning. 
(e) > 0, . 0, y*^  = y.^ , y*^  < y^ ,^ i, je(l r). 
ke(l, ..., t) 
implies a misallocation of factor k. 
(f) >0, i = (1, ...» r), ke(l, b). 
implies possibility of expansion of stock of factor k in future. 
At this juncture it may be of interest to consider the result 
brought about by the explicit introduction and consideration of those 
factors necessary to the usage of fixed factor (e.g., energy require­
ments, maintenance). The crux of the matter shall be (intuitively) 
that the introduction of the above consideration will cause a contrac­
tion of the relevant economic region of substitution. That is, unless 
those aforementioned costs of operation are negligible the firm will 
24 
intensify its usage of a given fixed factor not until the marginal 
physical product of that factor vanishes, but rather to the point where 
an increase in operating costs due to capacity intensification are just 
equal to the accompanying reduction in variable costs engendered through 
such intensification. Graphically one might envision the modification 
of Figure 1 offered by Figure 3 (below). 
Figure 3. Introduction of operating costs 
In Figure 3 positive operating costs are associated with the 
usgae of y^  ^and the "economic" ridge line appears to the right of the 
ridge line OB along which the marginal physical product of y^  ^is 





the cost of production of at the level is now pictured as (v^ ^^  
~ * * 
rather than (v^ ,^ y^ )^. 
For the mathematical conclusions of relevance consider the now 
modified cost function 
C = C[V, Z(Y)] + F (2.17) 
C — (c^ » • • • > ' ' ' t 
Z — • • • > . 
Z is a vector of variable inputs associated directly with the operation 
1 . 
of fixed factors. It shall be assumed that the cost minimizing com­
binations of these specialized variable inputs have already been de-
* 
termined so that the positing of a usage level y^ j^  immediately allows 
2 
cne to, in turn, posit the associated (minimized) operating costs. 
Except for the inclusion of Z(Y) in (2.17) the cost minimization 
problem is essentially the same as that given by (2.3) and (2.4). 
Therefore consider the modified lagrangean expression 
L'(V, Y, X, U) = C[V, Z(Y)] + <X, Q-Q> + <U, G> (2.18) 
T^hey do not appear (in this treatment) in the vector of variable 
factors V = (v^ , ..., v^ ). 
2 
Z(Y) could also be included in the production function, however 
to do so eventually leads to uncalled for difficulties with respect to 
both manipulation of terms and assignments of marginal products. 
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where G is the vector of constraints on the fixed factors. If the 
normality condition is fulfilled at (V, Y) and the first order necessary 
conditions hold when evaluated at (V, Y), then a further necessary 
condition for (V, Y) to minimize C locally is that 
<Vqi(V, y), Ai> = 0 (2.19) 
where v^  ^is the gradient vector of the i^  ^equality constraint, and 
fit-fic) • 
Now setting i = 1 and 3q^ /3y^  ^= 0 -V* k #1 and setting i = 1 yields 
3q^  3q^  9q^  3q^  
Î) • 
•••• 'ij-'y •••' ^ is-"is' " (2-2°) 
If (V, Y) is a local minimum then there exists a o neighborhood 
of (V, Y) such that C(V, Y) < C(V, Y) for all (V, Y) e NBdg (V, Y) 
intersection K, where k = {V, Y e RS+t ^ .-q. = 0, y.,-y., > 0, V, Y > 0} 
and (V, Y) e K. i iK iic -
Actually one has a condition on the positive semi-definiteness of 
the hessian matrix of L that is (V-V, Y-Y) • H • (V-V, Y-Y) > 0, where 
H is the hessian of L, and it is this necessary condition that leads to 
satisfaction of (2.19) (below). See Appendix. 
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Consider now the case where (v^ -^v^ )^ < 0, where j = (1, s) and 
AJ -J " 
the strict inequality holds for at least one jE(l, s). Further­
more it is assumed that > 0. One then has 
Without the explicit inclusion of the vector Z in the cost function 
one would be led to the conclusion that the total reduction in costs 
implies by the right hand side of (2.21) is 
"3 ("ij-'lj) 
However the fact is that Z has been explicitly included in (2.18) and 
therefore it becomes necessary to take account of the operating costs 
associated with the left hand"side of (2.21). Those costs are given 
by 
8C 3Z g 
(y-.-y^ .) = ) W, (ZA-Z2) (2.22) 
1=1 3^ 11 &=1 
where W is the competitive wage rate associated with Z-. Therefore 
ZJJ, X-
the relevant change in costs associated with (2.21) is 
C 
AC = % W.(v..-v,.) - I W_ (Z&- 2&) . (2.23) 
j=l  ^  ^ 2=1 
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Condition (2.23) yields the conclusion that the change in costs 
associated with the increased usage of fixed factor will reach 
zero at a lower level of usage than it would had operating costs not 
been considered explicitly. As such this is the rationale for Figure 
2 and the explanation which precedes it. 
Finally, utilizing (2.23) one sees that 
4" ; 0 as \  I  W.(v,.-v,.) | ^ I f W_ (ZA-2A)| (2.24) 
j=i J 2=1 
and that the firm will increase its usage of fixed k in process 1 if 
AC < 0 and iff AC < 0.^  
Of course this last result really needs no mathematics to stand 
upon, that is if one is minimizing costs he does not, by definition, 
move from a less expensive to a more expensive input combination to 
produce the same output. The condition (2.24) can of course be 
generalized to take account of any process and any factor. 
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CHAPTER III. CLASSICAL JOINT PRODUCTION 
The second cost minimization problem to be considered deals with 
a multiproduct firm that operates in a productive atmosphere charac­
terized by what Dano [8] refers to as classical joint production. The 
technical aspects of this type of production are also discussed by Dano's 
mentor Frisch [11] and by Sune Carlson [6]. One might find this type 
of production represented mathematically as the implicit function 
• • • » • • • > 9^ ) ^ 1' •  •  •  9  Vj, •••» Vg, y^ » •••> 
(3.1) 
or in the alternate form 
• • • > 
99^(92' *••» •••> 9j.» 
9y ~ 9p(92: * 9^ » •••> 1' ^ i' » j^» ..., 
(3.1') 
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The scheme represented by (3.1) and (3.1*) diverges from the usual only 
in the sense of inclusion of levels of fixed factor usage in the produc­
tion function. 
This type of production might be characterized by imagining the 
firm as engaging in one complex process in which it simultaneously turns 
out desired, feasible, levels of the r goods it produces. Alternatively 
one might think of many processes being conducted under the same roof 
and sharing fixed factors in the sense that switching of fixed factors 
between processes is not only feasible but also costless. 
The function F, as it appears in (3.1), is assumed to possess con­
tinuous first and second order partial derivatives on the nonnegative 
orthant of . In particular the following derivatives are of 
interest 
3q^ /3v^ , 3q^ /3yk, i = (1, ..., r), j = (1, ..., s), k = (1, ..., t) 
3v73yk, 3yj^ /9v^ , j = (1, ..., s), k = (1, ..., t) 
e (l, ..., r), a,b e (1, ...» t), 
c,d e (1, ..., s) . (3.2) 
If K is the feasible subset [see (3.4)] of the nonnegative orthant of 
it is assumed that on some subset (which is not necessarily 
proper) of K 
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•P—, > 0 and <0, i = (1, r), j = (1, s), 
j \ ~ ~ 
k = (1, ..., t) . (3.2') 
Then on this subset of K, 
3q^  3F/3v. 
BvT " ~ 3F/3q^  - ^  
J 1 
3q. 3F/3y 
- 3F7^ - ° ' (3.3) 
The derivatives denoted by (3.3) would seem to indicate in the case 
where the strict inequality holds, the presence of all around substitu­
tion, however it is quite possible that in some regions derivatives such 
as 3q^ /3Vj or 3q^ /3y^  may be negative, since F does not ru. e out inef­
ficient operation, that is, given inputs any production function reveals 
maximum possible outputs, however the input combination noted may well 
lie in an uneconomic region. Assuming away such an uneconomic region 
at the outset through curvature assumptions really makes discussions of 
excess capacity quite beside the point (at least in the context of the 
problem under consideration). The condition (3.2') on the other hand 
implies the existence of an economic region of substitution and it is 
assumed that in the interior of this region that some or all of the 
derivatives given by (3.2) are strictly positive or negative.^  
All of those derivatives may be generated through usage of the im­
plicit function theorem and signs may be found through usage of conditions 
(3.2') in the economic region. 
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Consider now the problem 
minimize C(V) (3-4) 
subject to 
F(Q, V, Y) = 0 
Q - Q = 0 
Y - Y = 0 
Q, V, Y > 0 
where Q = (q^ , ...» q^ , q^ ), q^  > 0, i = (1, r). 
Assume now that the £+r+lxr+s+t jacobian matrix [J] (below) 
— * * 1 is of full row rank when evaluated at (Q, V , Y ). 
3F 3F 9F 3F 3F 9F 
991 *" ^ r 3^ 1 "* ^ s "* S^ t 
9^ 1 9^ 1 9q^  9q^  9qj^  
-1 
-1 
Sq^  9q^  9q^  9q^  9q^  
Iq^  ... -1 ... ••• gy^  
1^ ^^ 1 ^^ 1 ^^ 1 
• • •  5 ? r  ® y i  " •  ® y s  
3y£ Sy^  
35^  ••• 15;"3^  ••• •3^  ••• "^  (Q, Y*. V*) (3.5) 
A^ssume also that & + 1 < s 4- t. 
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In 3.5, 2 is the number of inequality constraints that are binding at 
— * 1 
IQ, y , V ). The condition (3.7) is a normality condition and has been 
2 discussed previously in Chapter II. 
The lagrangean expression for the cost minimization problem given 
by (3.4) may be written as 
L(Q, V, Y, X, u) = C(V) + <X, -F> + <H, Q - Q> + <u, Y - Y> 
Q, V, Y > 0, u > 0 (3.6) 
where A is a lagrangean multiplier, H = (h^ , ...» h^ , ..., h^ ) is a 
vector of lagrangean multipliers, u = (u^ , ..., u^ , ..., u^ ) is a vector 
of lagrangian multipliers, and < > denotes inner product. 
* * 
If (V , Y ) minimizes cost then the following conditions must hold 
* * 
when evaluated at (V , Y ) 
% • Î 0 
1^ - '••^7 Ï ° 
The binding inequality constraints were chosen arbitrarily to be 
the first £ where & < t. 
2 See also Appendix. 
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x|— + h. < 0 
aq^  1 -
X-P- + h < 0 (3.8) 
r -
+ "1 : 0 
+ "k ; 0 
*|f-+"tiO (3.9) 
(Q, V*, Y*) E K = {(Q, V, Y) 1 F = 0, Y - Y > 0, Q = 0, 
V, Q, Y > 0, u < 0} (3.10) 
— * * 
Consider now the case where Q, V , Y >0. Letting i, je(l, ...» s) 
and dividing the i^  ^by the equation of (3.7) yields 
3C/9V. 3F/3V. 3V. 
•' (3.11) 
9C/9Vj 3F/3Vj 3V^  * 
Now let ze(l, r) and divide both the i^  ^and equations of (3.7) 
by the equation of (3.8). This process leaves one with 
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3C/3V, 3F/av, 3q, 
"h " 3F/3q " " 3v7 
z z 1 
and 
3C/3V. 3F/3V. 3q 
h  ^" 3F/3q^  " ~ W7 ' (3.13) 
z z^ J 
Division of (3.12) by (3.13) together with the previously mentioned 
assumption that the firm buys factors in competitive markets yields 
3C/3V. w. 3q /3V 
3C/3V. " ^  " 3q /3V. ' 
J J z J 
Utilizing (3.14) together with (3.11) one has 
w. 3V. 3q /3V. 
Condition (3.15) should be quite familiar in the sense that it merely 
— * * 
indicates that at (Q, V , Y ) the ratio of marginal costs (in this case 
the constant wage rates w^  and w^ ) of any two variable inputs used in 
production of a particular good must be equal to the corresponding ratio 
of marginal products.^  The analogy with the one good two input case is 
quite helpful, however lest inference from that case be carried too far, 
one should, at this juncture, try to get at least a rough geometrical 
replaced 
I^n the case where v^  = 0, Vj >0 the equality in (3.15) must be 
with >. 
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picture of what is involved in this cost minimization problem. Towards 
that end, first pick all the feasible input combinations that yield 
q^ , that is, pick (V, Y)Ek^  where 
k^  = {(V, Y) I F = 0, y - y > 0, = 0, q^  f 1 = 0, 
Q, V, Y > 0} . 
Such a procedure yields an s + t - 1 dimensional level or iso-surface 
in the nonnegarive orthant of R (i.e. (p ). Repetition of this 
procedure for all of the r specified output levels yields r such iso-
surfaces^  or the set of sets K = {k^ , ..., k^ }. 
Define now the sum of sets 
H = I k 
i=l 
which is again an s + t - 1 dimensional level surface in cj) . Now 
delete from H any nonfeasible points (points that involve some non-
feasible level of a fixed input) and call the remaining set of points 
— 2 
H'. Any input combination (V, Y) £ H' will yield Q. The first order 
Ï — Pick_all feasible input combinations that yield q^ ; k^  = 
{(V, Y) I F = 0, Y - Y > 0, qi - q^  = 0, qj f i = 0, Q, V, Y > 0}, where 
i, jc(l, «.., r). 
2 (a) As one varies the specified output bundle (TJ), the iso-surfaces 
generated may (and most probably will) intersect, however this should not 
cause any problem. (b) H' = {(V, Y) | F = 0, ^  = Q, Y - Y > 0, 
Q, V, Y > 0}. 
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conditions then specify rules that the point(s) picked from H' must 
satisfy if costs are to be minimized. 
Continuing on with the inspection of first order necessary condi­
tions, division of the by the n^  ^equation of (3.9), where k, n e 
(1, ..., t), yields 
"k % 
"n ' 2F/2y„ - " ZXk ' 
(3.16) 
Redividing now the k^  ^and n^  ^equations in (3.9) by the equation 
of (3.8), where z e (1, ..., r), leaves one with 
3F/Syk u^ 9q 
9F/3q^  h^  3y^   ^ (3.17) 
and 
Dividing (3.17) by (3.18) and using that result together with (3.16) 
yields 
<v 8y 3q_/3y_ 
In the cases where either one or both of the relevant constraints on 
fixed factors are (is) slack or barely binding (3.19) is undefined or 
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vanishes [e.g., = 0 implies that the marginal product of fixed 
factor n is identically 0 in process z (in fact, in all processes) and 
that (3.19) is undefined]. In the case where u^ , u^  > 0 (3.19) merely 
reflects the fact that the ratio of shadow prices of two scarce fixed 
factors^  is equal to the ratio of the marginal products of incremental 
units of the fixed factors, the relative sizes of marginal products 
2 
reflecting the relative abilities to reduce costs at the margin. 
Assuming that both normality and first order necessary conditions 
are fulfilled and in addition that the hessian matrix, H, of L, evalu­
ated at (Q, V*, Y*) is such that (V - V*, Y - Y*) • H • (V - V*, Y - Y*) 
> 0, one can go on to posit the second order necessary condition that 
3q^  3q^  3q^  3q^  
•••• W;- 3^  
(Vj^  - - Vg*. yj - - y/)> = 0 .3 
(3.20) 
Perhaps one should not use the term shadow prices in the above con­
text, however, all that is meant is that uj^  reflects the ability of a 
marginal unit of factor k to reduce costs. 
2 
Many other conditions might be formed through various manipulations 
of the first order conditions, in particular conditions relating to al­
location of fixed factors at the profit margin. However, as mentioned in 
Chapter II, such conclusions are more appropriately relegated to Chapter 
IV where multipliers are interpreted in context of additions to net 
revenue as well as opportunity cost. 
3 
Actually one here uses (3.2) rather than (3.1) so that the con­
straint set is - qi(Vi, ..., Vg, y^ , ..., y^ .) = 0, i = (1, ..., r). 
That is, rewrite the lagrangean as Z = C(V) + X(Q - Q(V, Y)) + U(Y - Y) 
a n d  a s s u m e  F . O . C .  a r e  b o t h  n e c e s s a r y  a n d  f u l f i l l e d ,  w h e r e  X  =  ( X ^ ,  . . . ,  
Xf)' 
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Contemplating an increase in scarce fixed factors to be utilized 
in production of the i good, let dV^  = < 0, j = (1, ...» s), 
* 
and let dy^  ~ ~ > 0» k = (1, t). These last two assumptions, 
together with (3.20), yield the expression 
s 3q. t 3q. 
or 
s 8q. t 3q. jl ^  "j ' Ji ^  
where dV. = V. - V.. 
2 2 3 
The term on the left hand side ultimately represents a reduction 
in costs to the tune of 
I w.dV. 
j=i : : 
and therefore indicates that the value of the additional fixed factors 
used in production of comes about through their cost reducing abili­
ties, a principle previously demonstrated in Chapter II. 
One can show using (3.21) and setting dy^  = 0 that costs rise by 
the amount denoted by Zw.dV. and therefore that reallocation of scarce 
2 2 
fixed factors between processes involves opportunity costs that can be 
measured in terms of dollars of variable costs. However all this is 
done explicitly in Chapter IV. 
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The production function used in this chapter will be used in 
Chapter IV in the sense that the cost minimization problem depicted 
in this section will be assumed to have taken place. 
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CHAPTER IV. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 
In this chapter the multi-product firm is characterized as seeking 
to maximize net revenue^  over a given product line. Again interest is 
centered upon the economically relevant information emanating from the 
necessary conditions for a local solution to the problem inspected. The 
positing of a given product line tells one at the outset that any maxi­
mum, if achieved, is no better or worse than the product line being 
considered, a factor which will be completely sublimated by the very 
nature of the mathemacical methods used to treat the profit maximum 
problem. 
In this treatment the relevant decision variables utilized by the 
multiproduct firm in its attempt to maximize net revenue are prices and 
N.P.O.V.'s, the profit maximizing vector of decision variables being 
chosen from some feasible set; feasibility being limited by the limits 
of the productive capacity of the firm. 
Nonprice offer variations are, in a sense, individual aspects of 
the firm's sales effort, or as Holdren [15, p. 580] puts it, "any activ­
ity of the seller which is preceptibly distinct to the buyer is poten­
tially a distinct (nonprice offer variation)." Actually, for a discus­
sion of the sales effort and grounds for its inclusion in the analysis 
N^o discussion is offered below on the rationale for positing profit 
maximization as the objective criterion of the firm, not because the 
matter is trivial but rather because the subject deserves more than a 
cursory treatment. For discussions on alternative objective criteria see 
Baran and Sweezy [3], McGuire [18], and Baumol [4]. 
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one could harken back to the work of Thorstein Veblen [27] who recognized 
in a crystal clear fashion that the sales effort was woven into the 
fabric of even the very design of a commodity. However, Veblen given 
his particular inclinations, would have considered the decomposition of 
the sales effort into distinct entities, each one itself being composed 
of a combination of particles, a game for the misguided. Nevertheless, 
such a pursuit is well within the confines of normal science as it ap­
pears in economics and paradoxical as it may seem, might well be con­
strued as an attempt to incorporate that very notion of Veblen's (e.g., 
the sales effort) further into the corpus of mainstream economic theory. 
Bob R. Holdren [14] offers a somewhat exhaustive treatment of nonprice 
offer variations along modem lines and although the title of his path-
breaking work would tend to indicate an exclusive interest with the 
theory of a multiproduct firm devoted solely to retailing, that title 
is misleading in the sense that the work develops a general theory ap­
plicable to any multiproduct firm. Holdren discusses not only the general 
concept of a nonprice offer variation as it pertains to both retailing 
and manufacturing firms, but also discusses N.P.O.V.'s peculiar either 
to the former or latter. Scitovsky [24] also discusses N.P.O.V.'s in 
the context of the single product firm. ^ 
The fact that Scitovsky was mentioned last (and least) in no way 
detracts from the brilliance of his presentation but rather merely in­
dicates that Holdren's work is more relevant to this work than is that 
of Scitovsky. By more relevant, of course I only mean closer. 
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Another concept of interest used by Holdren [14, 15] and again by 
his student Gary Swenson [25] is the sales function of the multiproduct 
firm, a concept which takes account of interdependencies among the ele­
ments of the firm's product line. Although the sales function utilizes 
the information yielded by the demand surface the firm faces, the very 
word "sales" is an improvement in that it makes somewhat more extant 
in the analysis the notion that the firm has, and uses, the ability to 
manipulate demand. However if one wishes he may alternatively view the 
sales function as providing the firm with only existing demand informa­
tion and the firm as utilizing that information in its profit maximizing 
pursuit. In this sense, if one is permitted a quip, the sales function 
is indeed a function for all seasons.^  
The following notation, some of it already familiar, and some of 
it new, will be used throughout the remainder of the work. 
Q • • • » 9) • • • > 9^ ) (4.1) 
q^  being the level of the i^  ^saleable good; 
 ^ (P^ * •*•» P^ » •••> P^ ) J (4.2) 
p^  being the price level of the i^  ^saleable good; 
V = (vj. 
• • • > (4.3) 
whether such a property is an asset or liability is of course a 
judgement for the reader himself to make. 
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Vj being the level of the variable input; 
Y = (y^ , yj^ , y^ ) , (4.4) 
y^  being the maximum amount of factor k available to the firm during 
the time period under consideration. 
Y  =  ( y ^ ,  . y % ^  y ^ ) ,  Y  <  Y  ,  ( 4 . 5 )  
y^  being the level of the fixed input; 
A = (a^ , a , ..., a ) , (4.6) 
X w m 
a^  being the level of the N.P.O.V.; 
Q = Q(P, A) (4.7) 
is the sales function of the firm; 
9~ ^i^ l^' •••» *'•' Pji' •••> 3.^ ) (4.8) 
is the firms sales function for the i'^  saleable commodity. 
With respect to (4.8), 
9qi > Sq. > 
93-< 0' V7Ï < 7 0' * - . m), i - (1, ...» n) . 
i j W 
(4.9) 
That 9q.(p , p . ,  ..., p , a-, ..., a , ..., a )/3p. < 0 indicates i± 1 n 1 w mi
that the firm faces negatively inclined demand curves for individual 
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products over the region of interest. However, although the actual 
degree of competition the firm faces with respect to markets for in­
dividual goods may differ, it shall always be the case that the firm 
will evaluate the efficacy of changes in decision variables in light of 
the effects such changes engender throughout the product line rather 
than with respect to effects on sales of only a single good. This need 
to consider the overall rather than merely individual effects of changes 
in decision variables is perhaps the most dramatic difference between 
the theory of the multi and that of the single product firm. This dif­
ference will be repeatedly emphasized by the very form of the mathemati­
cal conditions to be posited below and re-emphasized through the economic 
interpretation of those conditions. 
That 3q^ /9Pj f i ^  0, merely indicates that goods may be, respec­
tively, substitutes, independent, or complementary in sales. That 
3q^ /8a^  ^  0 quite straightforwardly indicates the fact that some 
N.P.O.V.'s affect sales of q^  positively while others make their effect 
felt in the opposite direction. Obviously in a store that sells pri­
marily cigars the attempt to stimulate pipe sales can have positive 
effects in the sense of increasing quantity sold of pipes; can have 
further positive effects from bringing in customers (pipe smokers) who 
might also buy some cigars; and lastly may have the negative effect of 
reducing sales of cigars due to the fact that to many cigar smokers the 
added emphasis on pipes makes the establishment perceptibly less 
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attractive.^  Lastly 3q^ /9a^  = 0 would indicate either that this partic­
ular aspect of the sales effort has no effect on sales of this particular 
product or that the change was just not large enough to shift demand 
perceptibly. 
Finally, the production problem the firm faces is that discussed 
in Chapter III. However, the results could be extended to cover the 
production problem in Chapter II, the major difference being the neces­
sity of dealing with the opportunity costs terms (to be developed below) 
in a slightly different manner. Other relevant assumptions with respect 
to production and cost minimization will be introduced and discussed as 
the need arises. 
Mathematically the profit maximization problem appears as follows: 
maximize 
n = <P, Q(P, A)> - C(V(Q(A, P))) - F (4.10) 
subject to 
Y - Y(Q(A, P)) > 0, P, A > 0 . (4.11) 
This simple discussion is meant to merely hint at rather than ex­
haust possible cross effects since one could easily spend a great deal 
of time merely discussing cross effects in even such a simple case as a 
cigar store. That is, admittedly, the simplicity disappears when one 
realizes that merely fifty brands, each coming in about 5 to 15 sizes 
and each size coming in as many as 5 to 7 different colors poses grounds 
for considerable discussion of cross effects with respect to both prices 
and nonprice offer variations. Perhaps this hints at the fact that the 
successful small businessman may be, indeed, quite an entrepreneur. 
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The objective function is (4.10). The firm's profit maximization 
* * 
problem is to pick (A , P ) from a feasible set determined by the con­
straint set, (4.11), such that (4.10) is maximized. 
The seemingly strange or unfamiliar fashion in which the cost func­
tion and constraints are written is necessitated by the choice of (A, P) 
as decision variables and is explained directly below. First of all it 
is assumed that the firm proauces all feasible outputs under cost 
minimizing conditions. However even this assumption is not sufficient 
to rule out the possibility that an expression such as V(Q(A, P)) may 
* * 
not be a function, that is, at (A , P ) the mapping may be to a set of 
* 
vectors V rather than the single vector V . Therefore it is assumed 
that any level of output, Q, determines a unique V. This assumption is 
not really that stringent since in reality it merely amounts to the fact 
that the firm is aware of the input combinations it will use to produce 
various levels of output and that these input combinations were chosen 
on the basis that they could yield the desired result at the cheapest 
cost. The same rationale is of course used for Y(Q(A, P)). 
* * 1 
Assume now that (A , P ) is a regular point of the feasible set 
[e.g., the binding constraint set fulfills a normality condition at 
* * 2 (A , P )] and write the lagrangean expression L as follows; 
S^ee previous chapters for rank condition of Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa 
theorem or see the Appendix. 
9 







2» ..., Vj, ..., Vg) + " ^ k^ ' P' A > 0 (4.12) 
where 
U= (u^ , ..., u^ , .... Uj.) (4.13) 
is a vector of lagrangean multipliers. 
* * 
If (P , A ) is to maximize 11 then the following necessary conditions 
must hold when evaluated at 
ih 3Pi Ji 3v. 3qj 3P^  ji k 3q^  3pj -
< 0 
K ' i=l 'Pa j-l 1=1 8q. 3p^  k 3q^  3p^  -
jl K ' jl 1%% -^ Ji 
(4.14) 
Although the necessary conditions must hold for any maximum here 
interest will eventually be centered upon a local maximum. A point 
(P*, A*) £ K is said to maximize 11 locally if n(P*, A*) > II (P, A) for 
all (P, A) e Nbdg(P*, A*) fl K, where K denotes the feasible set. 
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Below, one of the inequalities in (4.14) is expanded so that the 
reader may see where the funny looking expressions came from: 
3q^  3q. 
SFT ° + Pi a;- + --- + Pi a;; + --- + p. 
31 (4.15) 
- ( 3q^  3p 
3vj^  3q^  3p 
- (• 
3C 
3v^  3qj^  3p 
+ aç_ !li fli + 
3v^  3q^  3p^  
+ ... + 
3C K ^'=1 a?! 
4. iÇ_ fil 
'Pi 
'^k P^i ••• 5'k 'Pi 
 ^  ^ 3C K 





3y^  H 




+ 9^ 7 9F[ + 
Sq^  9pj^  
3y 3q 9y. 3q_ 
+ . . . + —— —— + . . . + XT~ ——) 3q^  3p^  (4.17) 
where 




t n 9y, 9q. 
Further necessary conditions are 
M_- ? T T T 3 C_^ 
'^ 1 ' A ' j=l i=l '"j ®«i ' j.i '^ 1 
SI 
f T f 1£_!Ii 
1=1 'j=l i=l "j=l '"j 
t s 3y, 9q. t 9y, 
Expansion of one of the above inequalities, say the first, yields 
9qi 9q. 9q^  
Pi 31: + + Pi + ••• + ^n sir (^ .is) 
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• • •  +  
-(• 
9C 9v. 9q 
9a 
-(; 9C Sv» 
9v^  9q^  9a 
9Vi 9q^  9a 
9C 9v. 9q 
9Vj 9q^  9a 
3v 9q. 9a 
n 1 
9Vi 3q_^  3»^  
3v 3q^  3a^  
3Ç_flsf2n, 
3v^  3q__ 3a^  (4.20) 
9v, 9v. /9C ""1 . , 9C "M , , w-
-^ T- + ••• + 3:^  3_ + ••• + 3%- ?T-) se 9v^  9a^  9v. 9a^  




-u, k 9q^  9a 
- U  ( •  
9y^ 9q 
t 9q^  9a 
9y 9q 9y 9q 
+ ••• ••• 
* ••• 
9q^  9a^  
9a, 
(4.22) 
9yi 9yj^  9y 
âl^  + ••• + 0% â;- + ... +Dt 3^ ) (4.23) 
where 
n 9q 




J 1 1 




(4.23) = - I U 
k=l 
t 
k 3a^  • 
It is also necessary that A. P, U > 0 and Y - Y > 0. 
To interpret the term 9L/9p^  consider first (4.15) which is the 
marginal revenue associated with an infinitesimal change in the price 
of good one. As the individual elements of (4.15) denote, and as has 
been noted previously, the marginal revenue induced by the price change 
is actually a compendium of effects collected throughout the product 
line.^  From this term alone it should be quite clear that there is 
indeed a dramatic difference between the factors underlying the eventual 
production decisions of the multi and single product firms, that being 
the fact that the former is explicitly concerned with the effects that 
I^t is important to realize that a term such as 
to be evaluated at (P*, A*) with qi, i = (1, n-1), being held 
fixed at the level q^  = q^ (P*, A*). 
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changes in decision variables bring about in the sales of each and 
every item in the product line while the latter is by definition con­
cerned solely with the sales effect on one good. 
The term denoted by (4.16) represents the marginal variable costs 
associated with marginal changes in production induced by the afore­
mentioned price change. As such it is simply a compendium of marginal 
variable costs, again collected throughout the product line. 
The interpretation of the term (4.17) is, unfortunately, a bit 
more involved than that of the prior two terms considered. is the 
shadow price of fixed factor k. As such it tells one what another unit 
(conveniently defined) of that factor is worth to the firm in terms of 
an increase in net revenue. However due to the formulation of (4.10), 
that is, with respect to the posited decision variables of the firm, 
the level of usage of depends directly upon (A, P) and therefore a 
term such as U^ (3y^ /9q^ )(9q^ /3p^ ) reflects the value in terms of net 
revenue that would be brought about if another unit of fixed factor 
k were available to be allocated for use in that change in production 
of good n called for by the change in p^ .^  Looking back to the cost 
minimization problems (in particular Chapter II) it can be seen that 
such an addition in net revenue comes about due to the reduction in 
2 
variable costs of production. 
O^f course such a term would vanish in the case where the con­
straint on fixed factor k was slack or barely binding. 
2 
A, perhaps, more satisfying interpretation of Uj^  will be presented 
and used in the latter portion of this chapter. 
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* 1 * — Assuming now that P >0 and Y < Y reduces (4.14) to 
9q^ . s n gg 3v_. 9q_. 
, , T _ '1 V T 1 _i 
'1 il ^ il S ^ 
4. ? !2i ? ? À À  ^
n 3q s n 3v. 9q. 
il  ^" j=i il ^  ^ ^ 
The interpretation of (4.24) is quite straightforward in that the 
equations indicate that the marginal revenue induced by a price change 
must equal the marginal variable costs associated with that price 
change. 
If the products were all independent of each other in the sense 
that Sq^ /BPj f i = 0, then the conditions offered by (4.24), appropri­
ately altered, might seem to indicate that this multiproduct firm would 
be merely a collection of single product firms. However even in this 
special case the indication would be misleading due to the effects (to 
be considered below) of the N.P.O.V.'s which make themselves felt 
Indeed hardly an unlikely situation since consideration is being 
centered upon saleable output prices only, however, for the purist, 
one can assume that as the price of a good becomes arbitrarily small, 
the demand becomes arbitrarily large and therefore prices are bound 
away from zero due to the constraints on the firms productive capacity. 
The alert reader has probably surmised that Y(Q(P*, A )) = Y such that 
some y^  > yj^  implies that P*, A*) is not feasible. 
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throughout the product line, as well as the inclusion of decisions 
with respect to the allocation of scarce factors between alternative 
uses (again, to be considered below). 
It is also interesting to note that if the firm under considera­
tion were to produce only Q^ , then the relevant marginal revenue term 
with respect to a change in p^  would be + p^ (3a^ /9pj^ ) and that 
9qi > aq. 
4l + Pi + ?! (4-25) 
multiproduct single product 
firm firm 
and in fact, in the case of the multiproduct firm it may be that 
which again merely emphasizes that notion that the multiproduct firm 
is interest in overall reverberations due to adjustment of decision 
variables rather than just individual effects.^  
Now letting a, b e (1, ..., n) and dividing the a^  ^by the b^  ^
equation of (4.24) yield 
Surely the case of loss leaders is not unbeknownst to the reader, 
and although loss leaders are usually associated with retailing firms 
they are nevertheless relevant to producers (both wholesalers and re­
tailers) . 
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3q^  s n 3v^  8q,. 
(4.26) 
 ^ f ? 3C fli 
^ il ^ ji il ^  ^ 
. ? !!i ? ? 3Ç_^ !îi 
i=i P^b ::i il ''j ®Pb 
It is of course the individual terms of (4.26) in which any novelty 
inherent in these conditions must lie since other than that one merely 
has a ratio of marginal gains equal to a corresponding ratio of marginal 
costs. 
Moving on to the second set of necessary conditions and making the 
* 
additional assumption that A >0 one has the following set of equations 
? f ? + f ac-!ll 
i=l ^^ 1 3=1 1=1 ''j '^ 1 j=l '"j '^ 1 
? !!i f ? 
1=1 3v, 3q. 3a^  3v, 3a^  
* * 
The equalities denoted by (4.27) denote that at (A , P ) the gains en­
gendered from a marginal change in a^ , we (1, m), must be equal 
to the costs ultimately assignable to that variation. In particular 
those costs are the marginal variable costs of producing induced 
changes in output as well as those emanating from the use of variable 
inputs to produce the posited variation in a^ . 
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Now letting w, z E  (1, ..., m) and dividing the w^  ^by the 
equation of (4.27) yields 
n 9q. s n 9v. 3q. s  ^ 9v 
r 1 r V oC ] 1 , y oC J 
k!l^  il il '"i A '"i  ^ (4.28, 
? !!i f ? iç_ fli T 
i=i j:i iii '"j K s=i K 
The interpretation of (4.28) is analogous to that of (4.26). If, on 
the othar hand, a^  = 0, a^  > 0 and the strict inequality holds in the 
inequality of (4.18) then (4.28) would be modified to read 
? !!i f ? 2Ç_!!i!!i+ T A . A A ^  4i 
7 !îi 7 ? 7 
il ""l 3li j=l K 
Actually the information of interest is contained in the expression 
of (4.18) (now a strict inequality) which when interpreted merely says 
that the costs of increasing a^  from 0 to a possible level are greater 
than the gains associated with such a change, that is 
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Conditions (4.26), (4.28), and (4.29) together might be termed the 
first order necessary conditions for the case of all around excess 
capacity. 
Look now at 9iL/3p^  in the case where U > 0, that is the constraints 
on fixed factors are more than barely binding. The expression is re­
produced directly below as (4.31). 
 ^? '''i f ? 8C  ^f 
^  J i  °  i l  1  1 = 1  ^ •  
(4.31) 
At first glance (4.31) does not look very familiar in the sense 
that the majority of expressions examined prior to this point, although 
composed of what one grounded in contemporary textbook price theory 
might term backwards from normal derivatives, seemed to, at the very 
least, strike somewhat familiar chords. The expression of interest, 
however, does not seem to strike such chords. The problem is that 
one does not usually see terms involving fixed factors explicitly in 
first order conditions although such was indeed the case in the cost 
minimization problems done in Chapters II and III. Ample precedence 
for such a procedure is offered in Pfouts [20], Benavie [5], Ferguson 
[10], and Naylor [19] among others although their treatments differed 
in several respects from the ones being offered in this work. 
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In the cost minimization problems it was shown that the increased 
usage of fixed factors (when efficient) reduced the costs of producing 
a given product at a given level. This of course is nothing novel in 
the sense that it merely represents a parametric shift in the produc­
tion function which increase marginal products of the variable factors 
thereby ultimately reducing the variable costs of maintaining a given 
level of output. However in the case that the constraint on a partic­
ular fixed factor is slack, that fixed factor has been used to the 
point where a further increase in its level of usage would be detri­
mental to the posited goal of the firm. Therefore an additional unit 
of that fixed factor is of no immediate value to the firm and the 
shadow price assigned to that factor is identically zero. Alternatively 
one might say that the presence of excess capacity with respect to fixed 
factor k indicates that the price the firm must pay to obtain another 
unit of that factor is zero. But consider now the case where fixed 
* — 
factor k is scarce in the sense that y^  = y^  and > 0. Now the price 
that the firm must pay to use another unit of this factor in the pro­
duction of a particular output is no longer zero in the sense that such 
a usage involves a reduced level of output in some other productive use 
where the factor could make a positive contribution. A marginal change 
in a decision variable, then, causes a reallocation of scarce capacity; 
such reallocation involving an opportunity cost no less real than any 
other cost and measured in dollars necessary to purchase variable 
S^ee in particular the development using second order necessary 
conditions in the latter portion of Chapter II. 
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factors necessary to compensate for capacity reduction in areas of 
alternative use for the scarce factor. 
Consider as an approximation for that aforementioned opportunity 
cost with respect to a change in a decision variable, say p^ , 
t n 3y, 3q. t n 9y, t 
Ji Ji  ^^  ~ ^  ' Ji 
 ^ A  ^
where (4.32) is to be evaluated at (A , P , U ) and dp^  = p^  - p^  . 
Since is the value in terms of net revenue of an additional unit of 
y^ , (4.32) is therefore a weighted sum of values and constitutes a sum 
of costs to the firm in the sense that specific amounts of fixed fac­
tors have been diverted from alternative uses. To see the costs of 
diversion consider 
''l * j, Pi ''Pl ° + J, (4-33) 
1=1 *^ 1 J k=l 
v'here 
# ; 3c fZi , ? r 3C # 3C , 
Â Ji ^  ^ ' Â il ^  ° ^ '"j 
t n 3y, 3q. t n 9y, t 
Ji Ji ^ ^ ° À Â ^ ° • 
Assuming both sums on the right hand side of (4.33) are positive set 
dy^  = 0 causing dv. to rise to dv. = dv. + Av. in turn causing variable 
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costs to rise by 
s 
I w (Av ) 
j=l  ^ J 
which is a dollar sum exactly equal to 
t 
I \ày . 
k=l 
This simple procedure should demonstrate that the diversion of scarce 
fixed factors from alternative uses constitutes a cost as real as any 
other.^  
Reconsider now (4.33) in the case where dy^  is again set equal to 
zero but this time dv. is held constant, that is Av. = 0. In this in-
J 2 
2 
stance the term on the left hand side of (4.33) must fall by an equal 
amount, that is, the marginal revenue (approximation to) must fall by 
the amount 
t 
I U dy . 
k=l 
Tliis (somewhat rough) conclusion together with the previous one should 
serve to intuitively demonstrate that the value of scarce fixed factors 
A^ll this will be demonstrated below in a slightly more rigorous 
fashion through the usage of second order necessary conditions. 
2 
The assumptions of the case directly preceding this one are being 
maintained, however in the more general case one would replace the word 
fall by the word change. 
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is due to a reduction in direct variable costs and may be (in principle) 
measured by observing the degree to which marginal revenue falls when 
the usage of the aforementioned factors is restricted. 
In light of the discussion directly above it becomes evident that 
the conditions (4.26) are a special case which hold only in the instance 
that U = 0, and that the general case for U > 0 is given by 
n 3q,. s n gç 9v 9q^  t n 9y^  9q^  
a (4.34) 
""a * 8v.  ^ SP 
'b + I "i âi; -l 3^ 3^ »^ + J, 
Looking now at 3L/9a^  in the case where A > 0, U > 0 one sees 
? !!i= f ? aÇLfllfli4. ! 3ç_fli 
il "i 3^ 1 jii ik S'j 3^ 1 
t n 9y, 9q. t 9y, 
The main point of interest in (4.35) is that the opportunity costs 
associated with the variation in a^  accrue not only through the induced 
changes in output but also through the production of the marginal 
change in a^  itself. The appropriate generalizations of (4.28) and 
(4.29) are accomplished through inclusion of opportunity cost terms. 
One could, of course, in the case where A > 0, U > 0, add the 
further condition 
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9a + I 
i=l 'i 3p 
il ^ w
n  a r 1 1 ^  9 i ^ ^  ^  \  3 ^  s r  ^  Ï  \  ^  
(4.36) 
This expression, (4.36), is again merely a ratio of gains set equal to 
a ratio of costs, but it does however reflect the fact the changes in 
prices are, in terms of direct costs as well as opportunity costs, 
cheaper to accomplish than changes in N.P.O.V.'s. That is not to say 
that in actuality the costs of gaining information and expertise in 
the setting of prices is nil, but rather that the price change itself 
is not a produced iten while the variation in an N.P.O.V. is.^  
* * 
If the rank condition is fulfilled and (A , P ) maximizes net 
revenue locally, then one has 
(A - A*, P - P*) • G . (A - A*, P - P*) < 0 
* * * 
where G is the hessian matrix of L and is to be evaluated at (A , P , U ) 
I^n the case a^  = 0, the = is replaced by > . 
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The above condition yields the second order necessary condition 
(4-37) 
* * * 
where A= (A -A, P-P). Now, setting A - A =0 and y^  y 1 con­
stant yields 
3y^  9y^  9y^  
^ ' 
* * * 
(Pl - Pi » ?! - Pi , .Pa - Pa )> = 0 . (4.38) 
Multiplication of (4.38) by yields 
U Z ^  dPi (4.39) 
1=1 
where dp^  = p^  - p^  . Noting that 
3y n 3y 3q n 3y 
one can write, in the case where dp^  f a = 0, that 
n 3y n 9y 9q n 9y 
"l j, 3?^  = "l I ^ ^ - "l I NT . (4-40) 
Now arbitrarily setting 
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dq^ >0, i = (1, ...» d) 
dq^  < 0, i = (d + 1, ...» n) , 
yields 
d 9y- n 9y. , 
°i j, 557 = "i âïT 
The left hand side of (4.41) measures the increase in net revenue due 
to the increased usage of y^  in processes one through d while the right 
hand side measures the decrease in net revenue due to the removal of 
y^  from processes d + 1 through n. The fact that the two sides of 
* * 
(4.41) are equal indicates that at (A , P ) factor one is allocated 
in a fashion such that a reallocation (locally) could not increase 
profits. Alternatively, the losses in net revenue accruing due to an 
induced withdrawal of factor one must be just offset by the gains in 
net revenue which accure through its increased usage in alternative 
processes. 
Now still holding dp^  # a = 0 and letting all fixed factors vary, 
yields the set of equalities given in (4.42) (below). 
g 9yi " 9^ 1 . 
J, ^  '"i = "i ,=L ^  ''i 
1 ^ * Where da. = q. - q.. i 1 
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"k 1 \ X % 
d 3y n 3y, 
"t j, ^  = "t J,, 357 
Summation of the left hand and the right sides of (4.42) leaves one 
with the equality 
t d 3y, t n 3y, 
* * 
The equality (4.43) indicates that at (A , P ) the net revenue created 
through an induced reallocation of fixed factors will be exactly equal 
to reduction in net revenue engendered by the removal of those fixed 
factors from alternative uses. 
Going back now for a moment to (4.37) and hold dp^  f a, b con­
stant one gets the set of equations 
ayi 
9?; ^Pa + '^ Pb = ° 
at; dPa + dPb = 0 
3yt ay*. 
âF; dPb = 0 ' (4-44) 
67 
Multiplying each of the t equation of (4.44) by the appropriate la-
til grangean multiplier (multiply the k equation by ) together with 
summation of the equations yields 
r ^^ k I ^^ k 1 
At the profit maximum an infinitesimal change in any price will have 
* * 
the same effect. If (A , P ) is a unique local maximum one could 
amend the interpretation to read that at the profit maximum infini­
tesimal change in any price will reduce net revenue by the same amount. 
Of course the above analysis can be extended to include N.P.O.V.'s, 
however, as noted earlier, there is something to be said for the 
avoidance of tedium. 
1 Where dp^  = -dp^ . 
2 r For instance replace the r.h.s. of (4.45) with I da^ . 
k=l w 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
As indicated in the introduction, and as the reader must be aware 
of by this point, this work is not of the nature of an overall complete 
one in the sense that many important problems concerning the theory of 
the multiproduct have not been treated; some in fact have not even been 
mentioned. However, this work is merely of a part of what is to be 
(hopefully) ongoing research on the theory of the multiproduct firm. 
It is hoped, however, that what has been presented has at least 
amply stressed the nature of the multiproduct firm's short run profit 
maximization decisions as well as the increased role of importance fixed 
factors assume in both the profit maximization and cost minimization 
problems. Admittedly the nature of the decision variables chosen for 
the profit maximization problem lead to some unfamiliar and perhaps what 
might be termed unwieldly expressions. On this last score three points 
might be made, the first one being that, of course, any way of doing 
things different from that way which has been in the past continually 
stressed and practiced would seem unfamiliar and perhaps unwieldly. The 
second point is that symmetry, as appealing as it is, is certainly not 
the end of theorizing. Thirdly, the choice of decision variables was in 
no way based on the hopes of product differentiation but rather upon the 
notion that those control variables are indeed the ones of interest to 
the multiproduct firm. 
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APPENDIX. NONLINEAR PROGRAMMING 
This Appendix treats a nonlinear programming problem which is 
similar in form to those problems treated throughout the preceding 
chapters. The treatment of this problem (to be given below) is designed 
to parallel that used in the above mentioned problems. 
Some more general treatments particularly useful to economists are 
Hadley [12], Intrilligator [16], Benavie [5], and Tackayama [26]. A 
recent treatise by Hestenes [13], a mathematician noted for his work in 
optimal control theory, treats nonlinear programming via vector space 
methods. Of course this brief list in no way exhausts the larger set of 
works available on the subject. 
Assume that X is an open subset of r" and the problem is to maxi­
mize (minimize) 
f ( X j ^  *  •  •  •  >  X  , • • • » x^ ) , X  ~ (x^ , .. «, x^ ) £ X 
subject to 
gj (Xj^ j •••» •••» 0^, j — 1, ...,m 
h|^ (Xj^ , .. «, X. ««, x^ ) — 0, k — 1, . «, & 
x^  > 0, i = 1, ..., n (A.l) 
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where f, and h^ , j = (1, m), k = (1, i ) .  are assumed to be 
real valued and twice differentiable on X.^  
* * * 
Assume that x e K is such that f (x ) > f (x) x e Nbdg (x ) fl K 
* 
where K = {x|g^  > 0, h^  = 0, x > 0} and x E  K. Furthermore, assume 
that the following jacobian matrix J is of full row rank, 
(J) = 
3h, 3h, 3h, 
d x ' " d x ' " d x  






3gi 3gi 3gi 
3x, 3x. 3x 
3gd agj % 
3x, ' 3x,' ax 1 1 n (X*) (A. 2) 
d + & X n 
where d denotes the number of effective inequality constraints at X , 
d < m, and 2 + d < n. 
Actually if interest is merely of a local nature one need make 
such differentiability assumptions only on a neighborhood of the solu­
tion. 
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Now from the lagrangean expression 




+  ^ U. g. (x. ) • • • » 3c. ) • • • » X ) 3)where 
j=l J J 
where 
A = • • • » « « «, 
and 
U =  (U^,  . . . ,  U j ,  . . . ,  U^)  
and 
x^  > 0, i = (1, ..., n); > 0, j = (1, ..., m) . 
If X maximizes^  f locally subject to the constraints given in (A.1) 
then the following conditions (first order necessary conditions) must 
hold at X 
F^or minimization reverse the inequalities in (A.3) and (A.4). 
75 
Z 3h^  m 9g. 
S, 9h, m 8g. 
3=i-° 
3f . I 5 
* 
If X is a local maximum and (A.2) is satisfied then 
(X - X*) • H • (X - X*) < 0 (A.4) 
where H is the hessian matrix of L. 
Condition (A.4) satisfies 
<(!bs 
3^x,' ' 3x. 9x 1 1 n 
* * * 
(x. - X .  ,  X .  -  X .  ,  X  - X  ) > = 0  1 ± I n n 
where k = (1, £), and 
9gi 3^  3gj 
c.' ' 3x ' 1 n 
^^ 3x ' ' 3x/ )' 
* * * (x^-x, , . X  -  X  ,  . X  - X  )> = 0 
J .  J .  1 1  n  n  
where j e J = (1, ..., d), and J is the set of inequality constraints 
* 
that are binding at X . 
